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A wide variety of tools for distributional analysis have developed from the original insights
provided by Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973). For inequality comparisons, Lorenz
dominance is accepted as the criterion for ‘unambiguous’ or ‘value-free’ inequality rankings.
When more detailed analysis is required, numerous ‘Lorenz consistent’ inequality indices
available for application. In the context of welfare evaluation, a similar ‘unambiguous’ ranking
criterion is provided by generalised Lorenz dominance (Shorrocks, 1983), and this can be
supplemented when necessarywith specificwelfareindicators that respect the generalised Lorenz
ordering.
While this array of tools may seem sufficient for everyday needs, they have been developed
for a so-called homogeneous population whose members are assumed to be identical in all
respects except for a uni-dimensional measure of income (or an alternative scalar measure of
resources). This is not a comfortable restriction given the variety of personal, household and
environmental factors, such as household size, leisure hours and local commodity prices, which
applied economists often wish to take into account when making welfare judgements. To
accommodate a heterogeneous population — i.e. one containing income units with diverse and
welfare-relevant non-incomecharacteristics — researchers typicallyadopt atwo-stage procedure,
first adjusting the raw income figures to compensate for differences in non-income factors, and
then applying the standard tools to the set of ‘equivalent incomes’, treating the revised income
values as if they had been obtained for a homogeneous population. The first stage of this
procedure has been subject to a great deal of refinement, especially with regard to the scale
factors used to adjust for household size. Until relatively recently, however, the second stage of
2
the procedure received little attention, despite the absence of a clear theoretical foundation forSubsequent contributions include Bourguignon (1989), Sen (1992), Jenkins and Lambert (1993), Tsui (1995,
3
1999, 2002), Maasoumi (1999), Ok and Lambert (1999), Mukherjee (2001), Lambert and Ramos (2002) and
Fleurbaey et al. (2003).
See Ebert and Moyes (2003), Trannoy (2003) and Ooghe (2003) for discussions of related issues.
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the methods commonly employed in practice.
This paperattempts toprovidea rigorous foundation for the inequalityand welfare evaluation
of income distributions in a heterogeneous environment. Given that members of the population
are characterised by more than one welfare-relevant attribute, the topic might be viewed as a
multi-dimensional problem of the type explored by Kolm (1977), Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1982, 1987), Maasoumi (1986), and others. However, multi-dimensional analysis typically has
3
a strong ordinal flavour, placing few constraints on the wayin which personal and environmental
attributes can be traded-off against each other. In contrast, use of equivalence scale factors and
similar constructs to make compensatory income adjustments presupposes that such trade-offs
are always possible. This is the starting point of the approach adopted in this paper
The need for a reappraisal of conventional methodology became more evident following
Glewwe (1991) who showed how a regressive income transfer from a less well-off household
can, in certain circumstances, reduce the measured level of inequality. Ebert (1995, 1997, 1999)
pursues further the logical consequences of Glewwe’s example, by constructing heterogeneous
indices of welfare and inequality which respond in the expected way to regressive income
transfers, and by identifying circumstances in which these indices agree on their ranking of any
given pair of distributions. Similar criteria were also proposed by Pyatt (1990). However the
4
procedures which they recommended are not those employed in practice by researchers
undertaking distributional analysis.
The paper begins with a discussion of measures of living standards which allow members of
the population to be completely ordered according to their level of material well-being. This is
followed in Section 3 by a brief summary of some of the well-known results for homogeneous
income distributions. Section 4 describes various principles for heterogeneous inequality and3
welfare analysis, focusing in particular on two plausible axioms: the equity preference condition
which says that welfare rises (and inequalityfalls) when income is transferred to those worse-off;
and the compensation principle which demands that welfare and inequality remain unchanged
whenever a member of the population is replaced by another with the same standard of living,
but possibly different personal characteristics. While both of these properties seem intuitively
appealing, they turn out to be compatible only in exceptional circumstances. So one has to be
discarded.
For welfare analysis, the compensation principle seems the more compelling requirement.
By dispensing with equity preference, Section 5 is able to vindicate certain procedures applied
to heterogeneous welfare comparisons in the past. It is noted, however, that these procedures may
not be well-founded unless living standards are homothetic. It is also demonstrated that the
compensation principle is compatible with a less demanding equity criterion inspired by Sen’s
(1973) Weak Equity Axiom. For inequality comparisons, equity preference appears the more
natural point of departure, so the inequality analysis of Section 6 proceeds on this basis. The
results enable the contributions of Glewwe (1990) and Ebert (1995, 1997, 1999) to be understood
and evaluated. But the discussion also reveals a number of problems which cast doubt on the
wisdom of continuing further along these lines. Section 7 spells out the implications of the
preceding results for populations of households distinguished by family size, and the paper ends
with a summary of the main conclusions.
2. Living Standards and Equivalent Incomes
Consider a population of n  2 individuals indexed by the set N = {1, 2, ..., n}, and suppose
that the inequality and welfare relevant characteristics of person i  N are captured by per-capita
nominal household income y  =( 0 ,) and a non-income parameter θ,r e f e r r e dt oa st h e i ++ i
‘personal type’ and treated as a scalar variable, although it could equally well be a vector. It
should be emphasised at the outset that the decision to take individuals (rather than households)
as the economic unit, and per-capita household income as the measure of economic resources,Indeed, the chosen method of representation is sufficiently general to encompass intra-household variations in
5
living standards of the kind discussed by Lazear and Michael (1986, 1988), Haddad and Kanbur (1990) and Thomas
(1990), although this is not an issue explored in this paper.
The differentiability assumption imposed here and elsewhere may be replaced by continuity for most of the
6
results. However, differentiability is a prerequisite in Proposition 1, so it is convenient to include it at the outset.
4
does not prejudice the results in any way. The principal reason for basing the analysis on
5
individuals is that the size of the population is not affected by the various ways in which
individuals maygroup themselves into households. Per-capita household income is chosen as the
resource variable in preference to household income in order that the values of y summed across i
individuals yield the aggregate income of the population.
Individuals are completely ordered by their living standard v(y, θ), which may be regarded
as a cardinal an interpersonally comparable indirect utility function with prices suppressed or
absorbed into θ.F o ra l lθ, v(, θ) is assumed to be increasing and differentiable. Furthermore, the
6
units in which v is measured may be calibrated so that
(1) v(y, θ )=y, for all y >0
*
for some arbitrarily chosen personal reference type θ .I fv(, θ)=v(, θ )f o ra l lθ, then variations
**
in θ have no impact on living standards, and the environment may be said to be effectively
homogeneous. To avoid this degenerate case it is assumed that
(2) v(y, θ)  y for some θ and some y >0 .
Living standards may also be defined in terms of the dual function c(u, θ), which represents
the cost of achieving the living standard level u by a person of type θ, and which satisfies
(3) c(v(y, θ), θ)=y for all θ and all y >0 ,
with c(u, θ )=u for all u > 0 under the normalisation (1). For expositional purposes it is more
*
convenient here to frame the analysis in terms of the living standard v, although studies of house-





The reason why living standards depend on non-income factors is often attributed to
differences in ‘needs’. Specifically, if
(4) v(y, θ )>v(y, θ ) for all y >0 , 12
then a θ -type person can be said to have uniformly greater needs than a -type person. The 2
discussion of differences in needs has tended to focus on the issue of household size, with a
presumption that a larger family requires a higher income to achieve any given standard of
living. However, identifying θ with household size introduces a number of complications. To
begin with, a larger family with the same household income has both a lower standard of living
and a greater number of representatives in the population of individuals. Secondly, a larger
family is usually thought to be better-off than a smaller family with the same per capita
household income. So the decision to use per capita household income as the resource variable,
combined with the definition of greater needs given in (4), suggests that larger families are less
needy. Interpretation of θ in terms of household size may therefore produce an element of
confusion that is best avoided at this stage.
In the motivation for the Weak Equity Axiom, Sen (1973) uses the example of a physical
handicap — specifically, the situation of a cripple — to convey the idea of greater need. By side-
stepping the problems raised by having different sample weights attached to individual
observations, this interpretation provides a clearer illustration of the central issue. More
generally, (4) may be taken to mean that a θ -type person is ‘handicapped’ or ‘disadvantaged’ 2
relative to a θ -type person, terminology which covers not only the situation of the cripple 1
described by Sen, but also circumstances in which a θ -type person may be said to face the 2
handicap of higher prices, say, if this is the source of differences between θ and θ . 12
Given an arbitraryreference type , the (living standard) equivalent income e >0o fat y p e
θ person with income y is given implicitly by
(5) = v(y, θ),
or explicitly by e = c(v(y, θ), ). It is assumed throughout that θ provides a valid reference type
*ˆ θ
ˆ θ ˆ θ
ˆ θ











by an asterisk, so that
(6) y = c(v(y, θ), θ )=v(y, θ) > 0 for all θ and all y >0 .
**
Conditions (1) and (6) imply that y may attain any value in the interval  . If equivalent
*
++
incomes are also well defined for the reference type , then
(7) e = c(v(y, θ), ) = c(y ,) > 0 f o r a l l y >0 .
**
Furthermore, from (5) it follows that v(e,) = v(y, θ)=y must have a solution e >0f o ra n y
*
value y > 0, and hence, using (6), that v(y,)  0a sy  0, and that v(y,) as y  . More
*
generally, if equivalent incomes are well defined for any choice of reference type, as typically
seems to be assumed, then
(8a) v(y, θ)= c(u, θ) = 0 for all θ;
(8b) v(y, θ)= c(u, θ)= for all θ.
Although not strictly necessary, the boundary conditions (8) enable a number of the subse-
quent results to be stated more succinctly. Since nothing of substance is gained byomitting these
restrictions, the remainder of the paper will focus on the set V of living standard functions v(y, θ)
which are increasing and differentiable in y, and which satisfy the normalisation condition (1),
the heterogeneity requirement (2) and the boundary constraints (8).
Ideally, one would like to be able to offer procedures for inequality and welfare analysis of
heterogeneous income distributions under a wide variety of specifications of living standards.
This turns out to be an impossible goal. As will be demonstrated later, unless v  V is heavily
circumscribed, distributional comparisons will either depend on the personal type used as the
reference for the equivalent income calculations, or else require the selection of particular
inequality or welfare indices, decisions not best left to the idiosyncratic choices of individual










˜ F ˜ F
˜ F
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(9) v(y, θ)=y/a(θ); c(u, θ)=a(θ)u, a(θ)>0 .
Compliance with (9) implies that equivalent incomes based on θ (or, indeed, any other choice
*
of reference type) are obtained by deflating reported incomes by a constant scale factor
independent of the level of income.
Homotheticityis a undoubtedlya serious constraint to impose on living standards. However,
its practical significance for distributional evaluation is mitigated by the fact that most empirical
applications to heterogeneous populations adopt this restriction. In particular, adjustments to
compensate for differences in household size invariably employ a constant household
equivalence scale factor A, say, which, for households of size m with household income my,
would yield a(θ)=A/m in (9). Similarly, if θ is designed to capture commodity price variations,
then nominal incomes are typicallydeflated bya relative price index P which does not vary with
income. Following Lewbel (1989), equivalence scale factors that conform with (9) may be said
to have an IB (independent of base level utility or income) form.
3. The Evaluation of Homogeneous Income Distributions
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of heterogeneous populations it is necessary to
review some of the tools which have been developed for homogeneous distributions and which
have traditionally been applied also to heterogeneous populations once reported incomes are
converted into their equivalent income values. Denoting byF the set of cumulative distribution
functions on  with finite mean, the Lorenz curve for F  F is defined by ++
(10) L(F; p)= , p  [0, 1],
where µ(F) = is the mean of F. The distribution F is said to (weakly) Lorenz
dominate (written F  ) if and only if L
















0 t < x
1 t  x
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In a similar fashion, the generalised Lorenz curve for F  F is defined by
(12) GL(F; p)= =µ( F)L(F; p), p  [0, 1],
and F is said to (weakly) generalised Lorenz dominate (written F  ) if and only if GL
(13) GL(F; p)  GL(; p) for all p  [0, 1].
For the distributions in F, generalised Lorenz dominance is equivalent to second degree
stochastic dominance; it is also equivalent to weak majorisation from below (see Marshall and
Olkin, 1979) when the distributions correspond to equal weighted samples of income
observations.
In practice, researchers are most likely to confront distributional data consisting of a set of
income values x =( x , ..., x ) together with the associated sample weights w =( w , ..., w ). The 1 n 1 n
corresponding cdf is then the step function given by
(14) F(t)= , t >0 ,
where
(15) =
is the step function in F with a single jump at the point x. In these circumstances it is
convenient to regard (xw) as an alternative representation of the distribution F,s ot h a tµ( xw)
may be used to denote the (weighted) mean income, and (xw)  (x ˜w ˜) to indicate a Lorenz L
dominance relation between weighted samples. Denoting the dimension of the vector x by n(x),
and defining the sets of differentiable concave and convex functions
(16a) Φ ={ φ:  φ is positive and decreasing}, ++
(16b) Ψ ={ ψ:  ψ is increasing}, ++



































Lemma 1(a) is a restatement of a familiar result on second degree stochastic dominance: see, for example,
7
Fishburn and Vickson (1978). Lemma 1(b) is a slight modification of Corollary 3.2.1 of Arnold (1987).
9
Lemma 1: Suppose n(x)=n(x ˜)=n. Then
(a) (xw)  (x ˜w ˜) if and only if GL
 for all φ  Φ.
(b) (xw)  (x ˜w ˜) if and only if L
 for all ψ  Ψ.
7
Most theoretical analysis of distributions is undertaken in an even simpler framework
consisting of equally weighted samples of n income observations, in which case w may be
viewed as an n-dimensional vector of 1s, denoted here by 1. This allows an n-person income
distribution to be represented by x  , rather than (x1), and Lorenz dominance and ++
n
generalised Lorenz dominance to be expressed in the form x  x ˜ and x  x ˜, respectively. LG L
Welfare functions for equally weighted samples are usually assumed to belong to the set
(17) W ={ W:  W is increasing and strictly Schur concave}. ++
n
The requirement that WW is strictly Schur concave serves as a convenient shorthand for two
important properties: W is symmetric,s ot h a tW(x)=W(xΠ) for all permutation matrices Π;a n d
Wprefers a more equal distribution in the sense that W(x)<W(x ˜) whenever x is obtained from x ˜
bya (mean-preserving) regressive income transfer or, in other words, whenever x,x ˜  satisfy ++
n
(18) µ(x)=µ( x ˜); x < x ˜  x ˜ < x;a n d x = x ˜ for k 	 i, j. iijj kk
Similarly, measures of inequality for distributions x  are typically assumed to be drawn ++
n
from the setWith a fixed sample size, it is not necessary to assume the replication invariance property commonly incorporated
8
inW andI.
Condition (20a) is established in Shorrocks (1983), while (20b) appears in Foster (1985).
9
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(19) I ={ I:  I is homogeneous of degree zero and strictly Schur convex}, ++
n 8
where the requirement that I is strictly Schur convex corresponds to the assumptions that I is
symmetric and that I(x)>I(x ˜) whenever x is obtained from x ˜ by a (mean-preserving) regressive
income transfer. Members of both W and I therefore complywith the so-called Pigou-Dalton
condition:
Pigou-Dalton Condition: The distribution x has lower welfare and higher inequality than x ˜
whenever x is obtained from x ˜ by a (mean-preserving) regressive income transfer.
A unanimous ranking by members of W (or I ) is taken to indicate an ‘unambiguous’
welfare (or inequality) ordering. As is well known, generalised Lorenz dominance and Lorenz
dominance are alternative characterisations of these unanimity orderings, so that
Lemma 2: Suppose x, x ˜  . Then ++
n
(20a) x  x ˜ if and only if W(x)  W(x ˜) for all W  W ; GL
(20b) x  x ˜ if and only if I(x)  I(x ˜) for all I  I . L
9
In the homogeneous framework it may also be noted that, for distributions with identical means,
welfare and inequality are inversely related. For if µ(x)=µ( x ˜), then the definitions of Lorenz
dominance and generalised Lorenz dominance given by (11) and (13) imply
(21) x  x ˜ if and only if x  x ˜. GL L
The principal aim of this paper is to extend the analysis outlined above to a heterogeneous
environment.˜ θ ˜ θ
˜ θ
˜ θ ˜ θ
˜ θ ˜ θ
˜ θ
˜ θ ˜ θ
˜ θ
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4. Criteria for Heterogeneous Comparisons
For an n-person sample from a heterogeneous population, the distribution of attributes is
denoted by the partitioned vector (y; θ)=( y , ..., y ; θ , ..., θ ), and the associated welfare and 1n 1n
inequality values are represented by expressions of the form W(y; θ)a n dI(y; θ), respectively. If
θ = θ for all i, j  N,t h e n( y; θ)i sahomogeneous sample to which the analysis of Section 3 can ij
be applied. In particula r ,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a t
(22a) W(; θ1)  W for all θ;a n d
(22b) I(; θ1)  I for all θ,
where W and I are given by (17) and (19). In this respect, the properties of heterogeneous
indices are extensions of those imposed in a homogeneous environment.
A number of elementary properties may be defined by saying that the sample (y; θ)i s
obtained from (y ˜; ) by a permutation if (y; θ)=( y ˜Π; Π) for some permutation matrix Π;b y
an income increment if y  y ˜ for all i  N and y > y ˜ for some i  N; and by income scaling if ii ii
(y; θ)=( λy ˜; ) for some λ > 0. Then a heterogeneous welfare index W is symmetric if W(y; θ)
= W(y ˜; ) whenever (y; θ) is obtained from (y ˜; ) by a permutation, and increasing in income
if W(y; θ)>W(y ˜; ) whenever (y; θ) is obtained from (y ˜; ) byan income increment. Similarly,
a heterogeneous inequality index I is symmetric if I(y; θ)=I(y ˜; ) whenever (y; θ) is obtained
from (y ˜; ) by a permutation, and scale invariant in income if I(y; θ)=I(y ˜; ) whenever (y; θ)
is obtained from (y ˜; ) by income scaling.
Another natural property for both inequality and welfare indices is an appropriate analogue
ofthePigou-Daltoncondition.This maybeformulatedbyconsideringamean-preservingtransfer
of income to a person with a higher standard of living, and saying that (y; θ) is obtained from
(y ˜; θ)b yaregressive income transfer from person i to person j if
(23) µ(y)=µ( y ˜); v(y, θ)<v(y ˜ , θ) 	 v(y ˜ , θ)<v(y, θ); and y = y ˜ for k  i, j. ii ii jj jj k k
A suitable extension of the Pigou-Dalton condition to the heterogeneous environment is then˜ θ ˜ θi
12
given by
Equity Preference: The distribution (y; θ) has lower welfare (and/or higher inequality) than
(y ˜; θ) whenever (y; θ) is obtained from (y ˜; θ) by a regressive income transfer.
If the welfare function W is equity preferring and has partial derivatives with respect to income
denoted by W(y; θ)=
W(y; θ)/
y for i  N, then, by considering an arbitrarily small positive ii
income transfer dt from person i to person j, it follows that
dW = W(y; θ)dt  W(y; θ)dt < 0 whenever v(y, θ)<v(y, θ), j i ii jj
and equity preference may be expressed in the more convenient form
(24) W(y; θ)>W(y; θ) if and only if v(y, θ)<v(y, θ). i j ii jj
Similarly, a differentiable inequality index is equity-preferring if
(25) I(y; θ)<I(y; θ) if and only if v(y, θ)<v(y, θ). i j ii jj
It may be noted that successive application of equity preference is able to rank only those
distributions which havethesameaggregateincomeand the same pattern θof personal character-
istics. To relax the latter constraint requires a method of deciding when a change of personal
circumstances leaves overall welfare unaltered. This is accomplished by the compensation
principle, defined as follows:
Compensation Principle: The distribution (y; θ) has the same level of welfare (and/or
inequality) as the distribution (y ˜; ) whenever v(y, θ)=v(y ˜ ,) f o r a l l i  N. ii i
The compensation principle provides a wayof capturing the welfare implications of changing
personal circumstances and reflects the standard welfarist presumption that aggregate social
welfare depends only on the utility levels of the population. It implies, for example, that if a
person becomes physically handicapped, but his income is raised to compensate exactly for the
disability, then social welfare remains the same. Similarly, in the context of household size
considered later in Section 7, aggregate welfare is unchanged if a couple’s divorce isNote that (29) follows directly from the Pigou-Dalton condition, given (22a).
10
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accompanied by a rise in the per-capita household incomes which maintains the living standard
of each of those involved. As will become evident, it is the compensation principle which
vindicates the standard method of dealing with heterogeneous populations.
Although equity preference and the compensation principle both appear to offer plausible
criteria for ranking heterogeneous distributions, they are almost incompatible as the following
result demonstrates.
Proposition 1: Suppose v  V. Then a heterogeneous welfare function W with non-zero,
continuous partial derivatives cannot respect both equity preference and the compensation
principle.
Proof: Proposition 1 is established by showing that W respects equity preference and the
compensation principle only if the environment is effectively homogeneous.
If W satisfies the compensation principle then replacing each person with their equivalent
reference type yields
(26) W(y; θ)=W(v(y , θ ), ..., v(y , θ ); θ 1)=W(y ; θ 1) for all y > 0, 11 nn
** *
and hence, using (3),
(27) W(y; θ)c (y , θ)=W(y ; θ 1), i 1 ii i
* **
where c (u, θ)=
c(u, θ)/
u. The equity preference condition (24) yields 1
(28) W (y; θ)>W (y; θ) if and only if v(y, θ)<v(y, θ), i j ii jj
in the context of the heterogeneous sample (y; θ)a n d
(29) W (y ; θ 1)>W (y ; θ 1) if and only if v(y , θ )<v(y , θ ) ij i j
** ** * * * *
when applied to (y ; θ 1). But since v(y , θ )=y = v(y, θ) for all i, it follows from (27)-(29) ii i i





that for any u > 0 we may choose y = y = u to obtain ij
**
(30) c (u, θ) === c (u, θ) for all θ and θ, 1 i 1 ji j
and hence c(u, θ)=c(u, θ )+β(θ)=u + β(θ), for some function β(θ). The boundary condition (8)
*
then yields c(u, θ)=u for all u and all θ, which contradicts the assumption that v satisfies the
heterogeneity condition (2). 
Figure 1 here
The intuition behind Proposition 1 may be illustrated by considering a simple two person
population with homothetic living standards given by v(y , θ )=y and v(y , θ )=y /λ, λ >1 . 11 1 22 2
Distributions with equal living standards may then be represented, as in Figure 1, by points on
the line OE through the origin with slope λ. The equity preference condition (28) requires the
marginal social rate of substitution W (y; θ)/W (y; θ) to be less than one below OE, while the 12
homogeneous (ie Pigou-Dalton) version (29) of the equity preference condition combined with
(27) demands that the marginal social rate of substitution is greater than λ above OE,a n dl e s s
than λ below. These constraints cannot be met simultaneously if the slope of the social
indifference curve changes continuously; hence the conflict between equity preference and the
compensation principle revealed in Proposition 1.
If Wis not required to be continuouslydifferentiable, then it is possible to construct examples
of welfare functions which satisfy both equity preference and the compensation principle, by
allowing the social indifference curves to be kinked at the points corresponding to equal living
standards (as depicted by the curve AA in Figure 1). For instance, when applied to the example
illustrated in Figure 1, the two person welfare function
(31) W(y; θ)=α[v(y , θ )+v(y , θ )] + (1  α)min{v(y , θ ), v(y , θ )}, α  (0, 1), 11 22 11 22
satisfies both properties when α <1 / λ. So equity preference and the compensation principle are
not strictly contradictory in the context of welfare comparisons. For practical purposes, however,15
it seems inevitable that one of these axioms must be discarded. Furthermore, the same conclusion
must also be drawn for inequality comparisons, since the analogue of Proposition 1 may be
established byconsidering a heterogeneous inequality index I(y; θ), and replacing W()b yI()
in the proof of Proposition 1.
If the equity preference condition is abandoned, as will be recommended for heterogeneous
welfare comparisons, it is still possible — and indeed required by (22) — to retain its homo-
geneous counterpart, the Pigou-Dalton condition. It is also possible to conceive other, less
demanding, equity criteria which are more in harmony with the compensation principle. An
obvious candidate here is the Weak Equity Axiom proposed by Sen (1973, 1997, pp 16-23). Sen
argues that if two people have the same income, and if one is uniformly needier than the other,
then an income transfer to the more needy person raises the level of social welfare. This
requirement may be amended slightly, without violating the spirit of Sen’s argument, by
supposing instead that an income transfer from the needier person reduces social welfare.
Weak Equity Axiom: Consider a heterogeneous sample (y ˜; θ), and suppose that y ˜ = y ˜ and ij
that person i is uniformlyneedier than person j. Then the distribution (y; θ)h a sl o w e rw e l f a r e
(and higher inequality) than (y ˜; θ) whenever (y; θ) is obtained from (y ˜; θ) by a regressive
transfer from person i to person j.
In comparison with equity preference, it is clear that the weak equity axiom is a less demanding
condition, since the welfare reducing impact of a regressive transfer is required to hold only in
particular circumstances.
For the example illustrated in Figure 1, person 2 is uniformly needier than person 1, and
distributions with equal incomes lie on the line OX with unit slope. The Weak Equity Axiom
therefore implies that the marginal social rate of substitution W (y; θ)/W (y; θ) is less than one 12
below OX, rather than below OE, as required by equity preference. Replacing equity preference
with the Weak Equity Axiom eliminates the conflict evident in Proposition 1, and allows the
construction of welfare functions with smooth indifference curves like that depicted by BB in
Figure 1. For instance, any differentiable welfare function which is the sum of an increasing andˆ θ
See Ebert (1997) for further discussion of this point.
11
16
log concave transformation of equivalent incomes satisfies both the compensation principle and
the Weak Equity Axiom (see Proposition 3 below).
5. Heterogeneous Welfare Comparisons
If higher social welfare is taken to mean a higher overall standard of living in the population,
it is difficult to see how the compensation principle can be discarded. However, equitypreference
is less compelling for several reasons. For example, if resources can be transferred costlessly,
then equitypreference implies that social welfare is maximised when living standards are equal.
11
So at the social optimum the living standards of those with serious physical handicaps set an
upper bound on what the rest of the population can achieve — a Rawlsian prescription that will
not appeal to most people.
The basic problem here is that equity preference provides a plausible principle of equity, but
social welfare depends on both equity and efficiency considerations. Those most handicapped
are likely to face not only a higher cost of achieving a given standard of living, but also a higher
marginal cost of raising their living standard. In this respect, they are a less efficient vehicle for
converting resources into units of living standards, and hence units of social welfare. Given two
individuals with the same income, it may be reasonable to argue, along with Sen (1973), that
aggregate welfare can be improved by an income transfer to the needier person: the gain from
greater equity may outweigh any efficiency loss. However, as noted in Section 4, equity
preference is considerablystronger than the weak equityaxiom, and takes no account whatsoever
of the efficiency aspects.
In this section, the equity preference condition is disregarded, and attention confined to the
set of welfare functions — denoted here by W — which are symmetric and increasing in
*
income, and which satisfy the compensation principle and the homogeneity constraint (22a).
Choosing as the reference type, and using the compensation principle to replace (y, θ) with iiˆ θ ˆ θ
ˆ θ ˆ θ ˆ θ
ˆ θ
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i ) ˆ θ
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(c(y ,) ,) , e n a b l e s WW  to be written i
* *
(32) W(y; θ)=W(c(y , ), ..., c(y ,) ;1) 1 n
* *
= W(y , ..., y ; θ 1)w h e n = θ . 1 n
* * **
The techniques developed for homogeneous samples may now be absorbed, via the right hand
side of (32), into the analysis of heterogeneous populations. In effect, this describes the tradi-
tional procedure for dealing with heterogeneous samples: convert incomes into their equivalent
income values, and then treat those values as if they had been obtained for a homogeneous
population.
By analogy with the homogeneous case, (y; θ) may be said to be unambiguously weakly
p r e f e r r e dt o( y ˜; ) on welfare grounds (denoted here by (y; θ)  (y ˜;) ) i f W
(33) W(y; θ)  W(y ˜; )) for all W  W .
*
The compensation principle implies that (33) is equivalent to the requirement
(34) W(y ; θ 1)  W(y ˜ ; θ 1) for all W(; θ 1)  W ,
** ** *
which in turn holds if and only if
(35) GL
by Lemma 2. For this reason, traditional methods assume that (y; θ) weakly welfare dominates
(y ˜; ) if and only if y  y ˜ . Thus the notion of an unambiguous welfare ordering not only
**
GL
translates readily to the heterogeneous environment, but does so in a way that allows the
dominance relation to be validated via the generalised Lorenz criterion.
There is, however, a problem with this argument. If rather than θ is selected as the refer-
*
ence type, then statements (34) and (35) require θ to be replaced by , and the terms y and
* *
i
byT(y ) and , respectively, where T(u)=c(u, ). The ‘unambiguous welfare ordering’  i W
*
is therefore well defined for alternative choices of the reference type only if (35) is equivalent





1 ), ... , T(y

n )) (T(˜ y
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1 ), ... , T(˜ y

n ))
ˆ θ ˆ θ ˆ θ ˆ θ
ˆ θ ˆ θ
This result (and also Proposition 4 below) is not entirely unexpected, given the frequency with which
12
homotheticity restrictions recur in discussions of interpersonal welfare comparisons: see, for instance, Roberts
(1980), Lewbel (1991), Pollack (1991) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1993). The principal difference here is the
concern with the (incomplete) unanimity ordering  , rather than a complete ordering or a specific welfare function. W
This contrasts with the claim by Glewwe (1991, p. 212) that ‘it makes no difference which method is used to
13
estimate the equivalence scales, or what functional form they take’.
The same issue may be viewed from a slightly different perspective by noting that the properties of the welfare
14
function W(; 1) defined for -type equivalent incomes are not automatically inherited by the corresponding
welfare function W(; θ 1)d e f i n e df o rθ -type incomes. In particular, if W(; 1)a n dW(; θ 1) are related by (32),
** *
then — temporarily disregarding condition (22a) — it is not necessarily true that W(; θ 1)W implies W(; 1)W
*
(and vice-versa) unless v is homothetic.
18
(36)  . GL
Expressed slightly differently, the coincidence between (35) and (36) requires second degree
stochastic dominance to be preserved by the transformation T, and also by its inverse T ,w h i c h
1
is true if and only if T is increasing and affine (Moyes and Shorrocks (1994), Proposition 4).
Hence
(37) T(u)=c(u,) = a() u + b() , a() > 0 ,
which the boundary condition (8) reduces to the homothetic form c(u,) = a() u. Furthermore,
as the equivalence between (35) and (36) follows triviallywhen v satisfies (9), the converse result
also holds. Hence
Proposition 2: Suppose v  V. Then the unanimitywelfare ordering  is well defined if and W
only if v is homothetic.
12
The lesson to be drawn from Proposition 2 is that generalised Lorenz dominance will not
translate to the heterogeneous environment in a consistent manner unless living standards are
given by (9). Those who have undertaken heterogeneous welfare comparisons in the past
13,14
using IB scale factors may take comfort from the fact that their procedures have a sound
theoretical foundation. But those who wish to accommodate more flexible representations of
living standards clearly face a number of additional hurdles.iN u(yi/a(θi)), u  Φ,
iN φ(lnyi  ln ai)




φ(ln (ys)  ln aj)
y  s

φ(ln (ys)  ln ai)
y  s  ds <0
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While equitypreference is difficult to reconcile with the compensation principle, Section 4
noted that the Weak EquityAxiom is a less demanding equitycriterion which is compatible with
the compensation principle in certain circumstances. To identify examples of relevant circum-
stances, it is convenient to restrict attention to homothetic living standards, and to suppose that
welfare functions have the additive form
(38) W(y; θ)=
where Φ is the set of differentiable concave functions given by (16a). These welfare functions
respect the compensation principle, and also satisfy requirement (22a). It is now possible to
establish:
Proposition 3: Suppose v  V is homothetic, and let W be given by (38). Then W satisfies
the Weak Equity Axiom if and only if u is strictly log concave.
Proof: Set a = a(θ) for all i, and define φ(s)=u(e ) = for s  . Then (38) may be rewritten ii
s
(39) W(y; θ)= .
Consider a heterogeneous sample (y; θ)f o rw h i c hy = y = y, say, and also a > a,s ot h a tp e r s o n ij i j
i is uniformly needier than person j. By the Weak Equity Axiom, a regressive transfer of amount
t from person i reduces welfare by the (negative) amount
(40) ∆W =.
So the Weak Equity Axiom is satisfied if and only if
(41)
whenever y >0 ,t  (0, y), and a > a. ij
Now if u is log concave, then φ is concave, and hence φ(ln (y+s)  ln a)<φ(ln (ys)  j
ln a) whenever y >0 ,s  (0, y), and a > a. So (41) holds, and W satisfies the Weak Equity ii jφ(ln y  ln aj)
y

φ(ln y  ln ai)
y












1 , ... , ln y

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
1 , ... , ln ˜ y
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n )
Note that if u is increasing and strictly log concave, then u is also strictly concave, and hence a member of Φ.
15
20
Axiom. Conversely, by taking the limit as t  0, condition (41) implies
(42) < 0 whenever y >0a n da > a , ij
from which it follows that φ is decreasing. Hence φ is strictly concave, and u is strictly log
concave. The proof of Proposition 3 is therefore complete. 
15
From Proposition 3 it follows that the welfare functions given by
(43) W(y; θ)= = , φ  Φ,
respect both the compensation principle and the Weak Equity Axiom when living standards are
homothetic. Although these functions do not satisfy equity preference, equity considerations are
still strongly represented, via the Pigou-Dalton condition for homogeneous samples and the
Weak Equity Axiom for heterogeneous samples.
For homothetic living standards it has already been noted that W(y; θ)  W(y ˜; )) for all
WW if and onlyif y  y ˜ . Restricting attention to the subset ofW which satisfythe Weak
** * *
GL
Equity Axiom yields a unanimity ordering which allows further pairs of heterogeneous samples
to be conclusively ranked. While it is difficult to characterise this additional ranking power, a
good indication is provided by the unanimity ordering derived from the log concave welfare
functions given in (43). For this set of functions, (y; θ) is unambiguously weakly preferred to
(y ˜; ) if and only if
(44)  for all φ  Φ,
which by Lemma 1(a) is equivalent to the requirement that
(45)  . GL
Thus, for instance, it follows from Proposition 3 that:˜ θ
(lny1  ln a(θ1),. . .,l nyn  ln a(θn)) (ln ˜ y1  ln a(˜ θ1),. . .,l n˜ yn  ln a(˜ θn))
˜ θ ˜ θ
21
Corollary: Suppose v  V is homothetic. Then W(y; θ) 	 W(y ˜;) f o r a l l WW which
*
satisfy the Weak Equity Axiom only if
(46)  . GL
6. Heterogeneous Inequality Comparisons
As noted earlier, equity preference and the compensation principle are not easily reconciled
in the context of inequality analysis. However, the objections levelled against equity preference
in the previous section have less force when inequality comparisons are considered. Indeed, if
the focus of attention is inequality in the distribution of nominal incomes, it is difficult to fault
theargument that measured inequalityincreases when a nominal income transfer is made to those
better-off, as equity preference demands. In contrast, there seems less reason to accept the
compensation principle as a fundamental requirement unless the concern is with inequality in
living standards (or ‘real incomes’), in which case it again becomes a plausible, and perhaps
compelling, axiom. This point will be revisited later.
To examine the implications of equity preference, consider the set I of heterogeneous
*
inequality indices which are symmetric, equity preferring, and scale invariant in incomes. As the
members of I are extensions of homogeneous indices via (22b), this set of indices are
*
unanimous in their ranking of a pair of homogeneous samples if and only if the Lorenz curves
do not intersect (see Lemma 2). The unanimity ordering given by
(47) (y; θ)  (y ˜; ) if and only if I(y; θ) 	 I(y ˜;) f o r a l l I  I I
*
is therefore the natural counterpart to Lorenz dominance, and may be interpreted as indicating
an unambiguous inequality ranking of heterogeneous samples. Since the definition of  given I
in (47) does not immediately yield a feasible method of confirming whether inequality
comparisons are unambiguous, it is necessary to explore alternative ways of obtaining a practical
validation procedure.22
As in the previous section, problems arise when living standards are not homothetic. Here,
however, the reasons do not concern alternative reference types for equivalent income
calculations, but relate instead to the conjunction of equity preference and scale invariance. This
may be seen by taking any I  I and, for simplicity, assuming I to be differentiable. From the
*
equity preference condition (25) it then follows that
(48a) I(y; θ)<I(y; θ) if and only if v(y, θ)<v(y, θ), i j ii jj
(48b) I(λy; θ)<I(λy; θ) if and only if v(λy, θ)<v(λy, θ). i j ii jj
But scale invariance implies I(λy; θ)=I(y; θ), and hence λI(λy; θ)=I(y; θ), which together with ii
(48) yields
(49) v(λy, θ)<v(λy, θ) if and only if v(y, θ)<v(y, θ). ii jj ii jj
So
(50) v(λt, θ)=f(v(t, θ), λ)
for some function f(v, λ) increasing in v, from which it follows that f(t, λ)=f(v(t, θ ), λ)=
*
v(λt, θ )=λt. Setting a(θ)=1 / v(1, θ) then yields the homothetic form
*
(51) v(y, θ)=f(v(1, θ), y)=v(1, θ)y = y/a(θ).
given by (9). Thus
Proposition 4: Suppose v  V. Then a differentiable heterogeneous inequality index I is
equity preferring and scale invariant in income only if v is homothetic.
In view of Proposition 4, the remainder of this section assumes that living standards comply
with the homotheticity (9) which, by suitably re-calibrating θ, can be expressed more simply as
(52) v(y, θ)=y/θ = y , for all θ >0a n dy >0 .
*
with θ now representing a cardinal measure of ‘need’.
n
i1
































To attempt to characterise the unambiguous inequality ordering  defined in (47), consider I
the subset J  I of indices which have the additive form
*
(53) I(y; θ)= φ(y /µ(y), θ), ii
where the partial derivative is increasing in t for all θ. The equity
preference condition (48a) then yields
(54) φ (y /µ(y), θ)<φ (y /µ(y), θ) if and only if y /θ < y /θ, 1 ii 1 j j ii jj
and hence
(55) φ (t, θ)=ψ(t/θ) 1
for some increasing function ψ, which upon integration becomes
(56) φ(t, θ)=θψ(t/θ)+γ(θ),
where ψ is convex, and γ is an arbitrary function. The subset J may therefore be represented by
(57) I(y; θ)= , ψ  Ψ,
where Ψ is the set of differentiable convex functions defined by (16b). Recalling the notation for
a weighted sample of n observations introduced in Section 3, it is now possible to establish:
Proposition 5: Suppose that v  V has the homothetic form (52) and that θ =i s f i x e d . T h e n
(y; θ)  (y ˜; ) only if (y  θ)  (y ˜  ). IL
**
Proof: Assume that (y; θ)  (y ˜; θ) and consider any ψ  Ψ.D e f i n eφ(u)=ψ(u/µ(θ)) and note I
that ψ  Ψ implies φ  Ψ.S i n c eJ is a subset of I , it follows from (47) and (57) that
*
(58) 	 .





















The observation that sample values have to be weighted by the scale factors in order to satisfy equity preference
16
was first made by Pyatt (1990) in the context of welfare comparisons.
24
(59) 	 for all ψ  Ψ,
and the result follows immediately by Lemma 1(b). 
This result appears remarkable at first sight. For it suggests — at least when living standards
satisfy condition (52) — that unambiguous inequality comparisons may be validated by treating
the (equally weighted) heterogeneous sample as if it comprised a homogeneous set of equivalent
income values with sample weights given by the scale factors. The intuition behind this result
16
is not easy to fathom, and it may well be the case that no simple explanation is available.
Proposition 5 provides a valuable insight into the paradox discussed by Glewwe (1991).
Consider the following pair of 3-person distributions:






In this example, somewhat simpler than that offered by Glewwe, (y ˜; θ) is obtained from (y; θ)
b yar e g r e s s i v et r a n s f e rf r o mp e r s o n1t op e r s o n2 .S o( y ˜; θ) is more unequal than (y; θ) by equity
preference. But the traditional method of deciding inequality rankings on the basis of the
(unweighted) equivalent income values would infer that y does not Lorenz dominate y ˜ because
**
the share of the bottom two-thirds of the sample is 4/8 compared to 5/9. Consequently, some (but
not all) of the indices in the set I must attach a lower inequality value to y ˜ than to y .I no t h e r
**
words, a regressive transfer appears to lead to a reduction in inequality according to some
perfectly acceptable measures.
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Equity preference may be confirmed by considering the three separate cases ; ; and
17
.Forexample,when ,we have µ I=, f r o m w h i c h
*




principle. So the Glewwe paradox illustrates the fact that once equity preference is accepted, the
compensation principle — and hence the traditional procedure for inequality comparisons —
must be abandoned. Proposition 5 suggests instead a comparison between the ‘needs weighted’
samples of equivalent incomes, and it maybe confirmed that (y θ) does indeed Lorenz dominate
*
(y ˜ θ) in the above example.
*
For this example it is also true that (y; θ)  (y ˜; θ) in the terminology of (47). However, I
Proposition 5 does not claim that (y θ)  (y ˜ θ) implies (y; θ)  (y ˜; θ); in fact the converse to
**
LI
Proposition 5 is not valid. For instance, if = (1, 1, 2), y = (1, 1, 4) and y ˜ = (2, 2, 2), then (y  )
*
and (y ˜  ) have identical Lorenz curves, and hence (y  )  (y ˜  ). But for ordered
* **
L
distributions y  which satisfy , the index ++
3
(60) I(y; θ)= iNj N θij θ +,
with µ = µ(y)/µ(θ), satisfies the requirements for membership of I when θ = , and yields
* *1 7
I(y; ) = 72/3 > 64/3 = I(y ˜; ) for the two samples defined above. So it is not true that I(y;) 	
I(y ˜;) f o r a l l I  I , and hence not true that (y;)  (y ˜;) .
*
I
Another point to note is that Proposition 5 may be invoked only when the two samples have
the same distribution of non-income attributes. The prerequisite in Proposition 5 may be relaxed
slightly to allow θ to be a permutation of , but this is still far too restrictive for practical
purposes. To omit the requirement that θ = in Proposition5—a n dh e n c ep e r m i tc o m p a r i s o n s
between samples with different patterns of non-income attributes — it is necessary, either
implicitly or explicitly, to assume that
(61) (y; θ)=( y ˜;)i f( y θ)= ( y ˜  ), IL
**
where = and = are the symmetric parts of  and  , respectively. While (61) might be a IL IL
reasonable requirement, it is not easy to see how it could be justified.˜ θ ˜ θ
˜ θ ˜ θ
˜ θi ˜ y

i
˜ y  ˜ y  ˜ θ
˜ θ
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Ignore this hurdle for the moment, and suppose that ‘needs-weighted Lorenz dominance’ is
adopted as the unambiguous inequality criterion for heterogeneous samples: in other words that
 is reformulated so that I
(62) (y; θ)  (y ˜; ) if and only if (y θ)  (y ˜  ) IL
**
One consequence of adopting the compensation principle for welfare comparisons and equity
preference for inequality comparisons is that, for samples with the same mean income, the
traditional link between improvements in welfare and reductions in inequality no longer holds
in a heterogeneous environment. Specifically, it is not the case that if µ(y)=µ( y ˜) then
(63) (y; θ)  (y ˜; ) if and only if (y ˜;)  (y; θ) WI
as might be suggested by (21). In fact, by considering the pair of samples given by





it may be confirmed that y  and (  )  ( y θ). Thus it is possible for one
**
GL L
heterogeneous income distribution to exhibit both unambiguously higher welfare and
unambiguously higher inequality than another income distribution with the same mean income.
Clearly, this is a conclusion which will not be digested easily by those used to working in the
homogeneous framework.
Another point to note is that if the only source of heterogeneity is the commodity prices
which people face, then the criterion provided by (62) differs from that usually applied. In this
example, assuming preferences are homothetic, θ may be taken to be the price index for person i
i, and these price indices will appear as sample weights in the Lorenz comparison between (y θ)
*
and (y ˜  ). This contrasts with the traditional procedure of simply comparing the (unweighted)
*
samples of real incomes. To justifystandard practice, it can be argued — quite reasonably— thatOne referee has argued that the earlier results are not applicable to variations in household composition because
18
members of the same family must have the same per capita household income, a constraint not recognised in the
formulation of the problem. While the assumption of equal living standards within families places restrictions on
the set of feasible patterns of heterogeneous income distributions, application of the earlier results is not rendered
invalid simply because they can be applied in more general contexts.
27
our concern is with inequality of real incomes rather than nominal incomes, and that this can be
accommodated by a minor change to the statement of equity preference, replacing ‘nominal
income transfer’ by ‘real income transfer’.
Proceeding one step further, it mayalso be argued that our ultimate concern is with inequality
of living standards, rather than inequality of incomes, either real or nominal. The compensation
principle can then be resurrected, along with the link (63) between welfare and inequality,
thereby justifying all the procedures traditionally employed. Given the problems encountered in
attempting to extend Proposition 5, this solution may well be the preferred option. The main
criticism is likely to concern the consequent reformulation of equity preference, which now
involves transfers of units of living standard between households, an exercise not easy to
envisage in practice (Coulter et al (1992), pp. 116-119). However, it should be noted that this
version of equity preference follows directly from two more acceptable and comprehensible
properties: the compensation principle and the Pigou-Dalton condition for homogeneous
samples. As a consequence it does not need to be independently justified, and may be dropped
altogether as a separate requirement.
7. Differences in Family Size
For reasons explained in Section 2, the interpretation of θ as family size has been eschewed
up to now. But since family size is one of the principal sources of sample heterogeneity in
welfare and inequality comparisons, it is worth exploring the implications of the preceding
analysis for this important application.
18
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Strictly speaking, this has been demonstrated only when the number of households in the sample is fixed, along
19
with the total number of individuals contained in those households. However these constraints may be omitted by
appealing to the standard replication invariance condition.
28
N be the set of individuals in household h. The number of persons in household h is denoted by h
m ,a n dt h e i raggregate income byY . For simplicity, it is assumed that all members of household hh
h have the same living standard; that household income and family size are the only welfare-
relevant characteristics; and that living standards are homothetic. Employing the notation of
earlier sections then yields
(64) y = v(y, θ)=v(Y /m , m )f o r i  N ii i h h h h
*
== = Y , h
*
where A(m)=a(m)m is the household equivalence scale factor traditionally used to deflate the
(aggregate) income of a household with m members.
The welfare analysis of Section 5 suggested that the heterogeneous sample (y; θ)i sn ow o r s e




Reformulating (65) in terms of households rather than individuals then yields
(66) =
=  for all φ  Φ,
which, using Lemma 1 again, may be expressed more succinctly as (Y m)  ( m ˜). A
*
GL
heterogeneous sampleofhouseholds is thereforeunambiguouslypreferred in welfare terms if and
onlyifthecorrespondingset ofhousehold equivalent income values weighted bytheir familysize
is preferred by the generalised Lorenz criterion.
19
While this conclusion should not come as a surprise, it does answer one question which has





A detailed discussion is provided by Danziger and Taussig (1979) and Cowell (1984). See also Ringen (1991).
20
These authors all favour using equivalent household incomes weighted by household size, as recommended here,
although the reasons they give for doing so are essentially personal opinions of what constitutes reasonable
empirical practice.
29
household data, theincomevariableshould beaggregatehousehold income, per-capitahousehold
income, or some other income concept; and whether households should be weighted equally,
weighted according to family size, or weighted in some other fashion. The analysis here
20
suggests that only one answer can be given to these questions: the appropriate income concept
is the equivalent income value, and the appropriate weight is household size. Many empirical
studies in the past have violated one or both of these requirements.
For heterogeneous inequality comparisons founded on equity preference, the unambiguous
(nominal income) inequality criterion proposed in (62) may be reformulated for household data
in a similar wayto obtain (y; θ)  (y ˜; ) if and only if (Y A)  (  ), where A denotes the IL
*
vector of household equivalence scale factors defined in (64). Here again the choice of income
concept and weighting system are determined uniquely. But in this case households are weighted
by their equivalence scale factor rather than family size. If, instead, heterogeneous inequality
comparisons refer to inequalityof living standards, then (y; θ)i sn ow o r s et h a n( y ˜; ) if and only
if (Y m)  ( m ˜), and the weighting system reverts to that based on family size.
*
L
8. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has tried to establish the principles that should govern the welfare and inequality
analysis of heterogeneous populations when households are completely ordered by their level of
material well-being or living standard. Two basic criteria suggested themselves: the equity
preference requirement that welfare rises and inequality falls when income is transferred to those
worse-off; and the compensation principle which demands that welfare and inequality are
unchanged when a member of the population is replaced by another with the same standard of
living. Both appear to be plausible and desirable properties but, as demonstrated in Proposition30
1, they are virtually incompatible. In order to proceed, therefore, one of the properties must be
discarded.
The welfare analysis of Section 5, based on the compensation principle, was able to vindicate
the traditional method of dealing with heterogeneous samples, which involves converting
incomes into their equivalent income values and then treating those values as if they refer to a
homogeneous population. It emerged, however, that conventional procedures relyon the assump-
tion that equivalent incomes are obtained by deflating reported income values by a constant scale
factor, independent of the level of income. Only then is it possible to choose freely the reference
person (or household type) used for the equivalent income calculations. Although the equity
preference property is abandoned, equity considerations are retained in the form of the Pigou-
Dalton condition for homogeneous samples, and may be expanded to respect the Weak Equity
Axiom proposed by Sen (1973).
In contrast to welfare analysis, it seems more natural to base heterogeneous inequality
comparisons on equity preference, as is done in Section 6. Here again it is difficult to progress
unless equivalent incomes are derived using constant scale factors. Restricting attention to
homothetic living standards enables the contributions of Glewwe (1991) and Ebert (1995, 1997,
1999) to be assessed. But even with this restriction a variety of problems arise in attempting to
characterisethe‘unambiguousinequalityordering’forheterogeneous populations (i.e. thehetero-
geneous counterpart to Lorenz dominance), and in applying the results to situations likely to be
encountered in practice. For these reasons it maybe advisable to make a clear distinction between
inequality of nominal incomes and inequality of living standards, and to focus on the latter when
undertaking empirical studies. This approach justifies the traditional procedures used in the past,
and offers a simple method of validating unambiguous inequality comparisons, via the Lorenz
dominance ordering applied to distributions of equivalent incomes.
Finally, the paper considered the implications for heterogeneous samples of households
distinguished by income and family size. Despite earlier suggestions that researchers are free to
choose alternative concepts of income and to apply alternative system of weights to household31
observations, the analysis shows that this is not the case. Once the compensation principle is
adopted for either welfare or inequality comparisons, the appropriate income concept is always
the equivalent income value, and households must always be weighted according to the number
of family members.32
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Figure 1: Social Indifference Curves for Heterogeneous
Income Distributions
Note: Restrictions on the marginal social rate of substitution result from equity preference
[EP], the Pigou-Dalton condition [PD], and the Weak Equity Axiom [WEA].